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Although the Zapatista and the anti-globalization protests are for some 
perhaps only a dim memory in our discussions of social movements today, 
they do provide the historical beginnings of the use of computer- based 
networks to organize and participate in social movements. They also 
provide a platform for an ongoing discussion of the role played by such 
networks in staging protests. In a constantly evolving Internet envi- 
ronment we still ask if a social movement can exist exclusively online or 
whether it also requires people to appear in the streets. Can a social 
movement be controlled from an online base? Does leadership of a social 
movement emerge from the online activity or does that only happen 
through face-to-face contact in meetings? Although we cannot answer all 
of those questions in our study, we do analyze the relationship between 
online and offline participation in one case. 
The social movement we chose to explore in terms of its online and 
offline components and their relationship is the Gezi Park protests that 
began in Istanbul, Turkey, in May 2013. This movement is important to 
examine as it represents an unprecedented massive outcry against the 
repressive policies of the then prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, 
largely from people from different walks of life who may talk politics
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within their closed circles but who rarely express their grievances public- 
ly. Those who took to the streets bravely confronted police armed with 
water cannons and gas bombs because they felt they had been disenfran- 
chised by the government that was democratically elected, but which 
viewed its majority status as a mandate to impose its values and policies 
on the people without consideration for any minority views. The Erdoğan-
led government ran roughshod over human rights and denied free speech 
to both the press and any individuals who voiced criticisms. Though the 
demonstrations that sought to defeat the authoritarian tactics of Erdoğan’s 
government were visibly short-lived, quelled by the exces- sive use of 
force, the movement lives on in forums and smaller demon- strations and 
remembrance-of-the-slain marches. It has also retreated to online spaces 
given the threat of violent reactions from the police force and the refusals 
by the government to grant official permission to street demonstrations. 
Over time two major theoretical paradigma, new social movement 
(NSM) theory and resource mobilization (RM) theory, have been devel- 
oped to address the rise of a range of social movements. Originally these 
theories appeared to be incompatible—one arising from a European tra- 
dition and the other from a North American perspective (Canel, 1997). 
 
NSM theory, for instance, questions reductionist Marxism, which as- 
signed the working class a privileged place in the unfolding of history. 
RM theory, in contrast, criticizes Durkheim’s view of collective action 
as anomic and irrational behavior resulting from rapid social change, 
and it questions ‘relative deprivation’ theory, which assumes a direct 
link between perceived deprivation and collective action. (p. 189) 
 
Canel argued that the two approaches should be integrated into a third 
approach that called on elements of both theories to form a new theory 
that minimized the deficiencies of both approaches. To this day, this 
integration has not taken place. Rather, as Klandermans and Roggeband 
point out in their introduction to the Handbook of Social Movements across 
Disciplines, theories have continued to proliferate according to their disci- 
plinary homes (political science, sociology, social psychology, etc.), the 
geographies of the movements, their historical bases and their thematic 
nature (2007). 
While the focus of this research does not permit an extensive explica- 
tion of the concept, we do not mean to minimize the importance of doing 
this. We draw on several scholars’ work when we describe social move- 
ments more generally, however. And our particular focus is on compari- 
sons between online and offline collective action in the Gezi movement, so 
we tend to draw on literature related to the role of the Internet in social 
movement formation and participation. Nevertheless, we are aware that 
activists use and produce a genuine mix of offline and online media as 
sources of information and tools to communicate and broadcast them-
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selves so as to enable their resistance (Cammaerts, Mattoni and McCur- 
dy, 2013; Rucht, 2004). Furthermore, we recognize that media and com- 
munication scholars tend to be overly media-centric, and that there is a 
small presence of media and communication practices in the vast litera- 
ture on social movements. With this study we intend to remedy this typical 
divorce (Koopmans, 2004). 
According to several contemporary scholars, a social movement re- 
quires the following four characteristics: “(1) a network of organizations, 
(2) on the basis of shared collective identity, (3) mobilizing people to join 
mostly unconventional actions, and (4) to obtain social or political goals” 
(Van Aelst and Walgrave, 2004, 88, citing Duyvendak and Koopmans, 
1992; Diani and Eyerman, 1992) [AU: add to ref. list]. In the case of the 
Gezi protests, disparate organizations (from football clubs to minority 
political parties, from communists and anarchists to nationalists, from 
Muslims to LGBTs) with the shared identity of standing in opposition to 
the prime minister and his party’s policies, joined together to speak to 
power in the form of their prime minister. From a political economy 
perspective, they were united around the following issues: protesting 
against the neoliberal agenda under the AKP rule, which led the country 
into a jobless growth pattern; opposing the commodification of labour and 
the degradation of the environment, which is considered as an inevi- table 
price to be paid for economic growth; and also opposing the blatant 
concessions to the construction industry, one of the backbones of AKP’s 
strategy (Civelekoğlu, 2015). However, in the aftermath of these demon- 
strations in Turkey, would-be street protestors have struggled to main- 
tain a focus on those characteristics through blogs, alternative online me- 
dia, Twitter messages and Facebook pages. Taking the square again has 
been limited by the threat of prosecution, the fear for personal safety, and 
new legislation that permits the cancellation of any meeting or demon- 
stration that is believed to pose a risk to public order (‘Turkey’s New 
Draconian Measures, 2015, August 7). 
We view the Gezi Park movement from three countries in Europe 
where the Turkish diaspora has taken root. Most studies of protests con- 
centrate on the actual participants in the demonstrations taking place in 
the streets of the country where the dissatisfaction is based. This study 
focuses rather on those members of the diaspora who reside in Germany, 
Belgium and the Netherlands. Many of these people were born in Turkey 
and migrated to one of these European countries, while others represent 
second or even third generation Turkish minorities whose only personal 
contact with Turkey may have been through vacations or family visits. We 
are therefore interested in the reasons for making strong connections to 
these demonstrations that would have limited effect on their daily lives. 
We asked ourselves how the solidarity with the Gezi spirit was diffused in 
synchrony throughout Europe. In agreement with the posi- tion of Bahar 
Baser (2015), we believe that while the above-mentioned
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motivations by the demonstrators in Turkey have little to do with the daily 
diasporic lives of European Turkish minorities, there are clear rea- sons for 
those living in Europe to feel the Gezi spirit and empathize with the 
protestors in Turkey. Some minorities are the descendants of the Kemalist 
movement; others were members of leftist associations; still oth- ers 
practice the Alevi form of Islam; while many are of Kurdish origin. Many 
of these minorities took refuge in Europe in the 1970s from repres- sive 
governments in Turkey during that time. Moreover, in European countries 
where demonstrations in public places are legal and protected, the 
protestors have been better able to organize both online and offline 
activities as their repertoires of resistance and alliance with their compa- 
triots in Turkey. 
 
 
STUDIES OF SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND THE INTERNET 
 
Early questions of the relationship between online and offline involve- 
ment in a social movement were raised when the Internet was in its 
infancy—and online interactive participation was possible only through 
list-servs, bulletin boards (such as Usenet) and Internet forums. Not until 
2002 with the advent of Friendster did social media begin to take the 
form that is more like what we know today as social networks. The more 
developed affordances of Web 2.0 allowed users to connect with far-flung 
individuals and groups more directly and sophisticatedly, thus provid- 
ing the structure for these media to play important roles in social move- 
ments. This structure is especially useful for movements like the one we 
focus on in this study where members of the diaspora can participate 
virtually in the demonstrations in Turkey, and develop a network in 
Europe to participate both online and in public spaces where they live. 
In the Zapatista movement, which began in Chiapas, Mexico, as a 
response to NAFTA, Marcos, leader of the National Liberation Army in 
Mexico (EZLN) made excellent use of the early Internet to mobilize sup- 
port from NGOs, the media, and individuals and groups from around the 
world. Furthermore, “the international attention this movement received 
served as a shield to prevent repression by the Mexican government” 
(Rucht, 2004, 42). As an early example of how activists were able to use 
online connections to sustain support and spread the word about the 
activities offline, the Zapatista movement represented the model for fu- 
ture coordination between real and virtual aspects of social change. 
Postmes and Brunsting (2002) highlighted this coordination in an ear- 
ly assessment of the role of the Internet in a variety of forms of collective 
action, such as that of the Zapatistas. The authors cited Internet-based sites 
as key to supporting and organizing offline actions (2002). “It ap- pears 
that during the past decade the range of collective actions that we knew in 
the offline world has been complemented by online equivalents.
  
 
 
DRAFT The Relationship between Online and Offline Participation in a Social Movement
 
Hence, the Internet has the potential to support collective actions, but it 
remains to be seen to what extent this potential is widely put into prac- 
tice” (2002, 292). 
In their study of a group of activists and non-activists’ attitudes and 
behaviors related to collective action, Postmes and Brunsting conclude that 
despite the fact that people use the Internet in isolation from others, it 
“would appear to exert a mobilizing influence, certainly on those who are 
ideologically sympathetic to the causes that are widely represented online, 
such as globalization and freedom of speech” (2002, 300). The authors 
suggested that the real influence of the Internet may be in the ways it is 
able to empower offline social movements that are created online. 
Today we may be taking that observation for granted. When we study 
the role of online interaction in the organization of social movements, we 
assume that its importance is critical. Mercea (2012) decided to examine 
this relationship empirically in three specific ways: he wanted to know 
whether  computer-mediated communication increased the  number  of 
people mobilized to participate in offline protests; whether the online 
environment allowed for increases in the new participants’ identity with 
the protest organizations; and whether those who joined the movement 
online affected changes in how the movements were organized (2012, 
154). He called the process of online participation leading to participation 
in movement activities offline “digital prefigurative participation.” A key 
variable in this study was the degree of risk involved for offline participa- 
tion. 
In his study of two social movements (the high-risk Camp for Climate 
Action in Kingsnorth, Kent, U.K., and a low-risk protest festival— 
FânFest—in Romania), he learned that the use of the Internet by those 
unaffiliated with a movement led to their participation in offline events 
when there was little risk for them to participate. But when the risk was 
higher, the Internet was more frequently used by those already affiliated 
with the movement. Identity-building online was not a significant con- 
tributing factor to participation for those in low-risk situations (2012, 
162), while it was a core value for the movement when the risk of partici- 
pation was high, a commitment to social change was called for, and buy- 
in to the principles of the movement had often already been made. 
Contradicting the outcome of some other studies (Mosca, 2008), Mercea’s 
study supports the “contention that mobilization into activism and the 
formation of a movement identity may largely hinge on unmediated so- 
cialization. Yet how sociality may be maintained or expanded through 
digital prefigurative participation is still an open question—and in partic- 
ular in relation to increasingly popular Web 2.0 platforms such as Face- 
book” (2012, 165). His study was conducted prior to the time of wide- 
spread use of social media.
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STUDIES FOCUSING ON THE ARAB SPRING 
 
Identity building was central to the role social media played in the Egyp- 
tian uprising. According to research conducted by Aouragh and Alexan- 
der (2011) the opposition activists used the Internet as a place where they 
could build a case for a social movement against Mubarak and the Egyp- 
tian political structure. One of the dissidents, Noha Atef, interviewed by 
the authors, stated that his favorite method for online activism was to 
supply information to others that would make them angry about living 
under such a government. So once users had consumed the materials he 
placed online, they were ready to take to the streets because the informa- 
tion he provided had already made them angry (2011, p. 1348). 
Studies of the Arab Spring uprisings in several Middle Eastern coun- 
tries offered the opportunity to examine the role of social media in street 
protests across the region. In a study of the Tahrir Square protests by 
Tufekci and Wilson (2012, 369), the researchers surveyed 12,000 partici- 
pants (yielding 1,050 valid surveys) in the Egyptian street protests. Most 
of the survey respondents were young, male, well-educated and had 
access to the Internet in their homes. Despite their high Internet use lev- 
els, almost half of the respondents had first heard about the demonstra- 
tions through face-to-face contacts, while another 28.3 percent received the 
first news from Facebook (2012, 370). Only very few respondents received 
the news from satellite television, radio or print media. 
When the researchers evaluated the relationship between participa- 
tion in protests held before Tahrir Square as well as those who were in 
the square on the first day of the demonstrations, they found some pat- 
terns of media use (Tufekci and Wilson, 2012, 375). Pre-Tahrir Square 
demonstrations were associated with use of print media, blogs, and social 
media for a range of information and print media and text messaging with 
information about the protests. On the first day of demonstrations, 
participation was associated with the use of blogs and Twitter for infor- 
mation and protest-related communication. Limited by the difficulty of 
collecting surveys during an active demonstration and therefore a lack of 
a random sample, the authors called for additional conceptual and em- 
pirical work to build on the “context and role of political communication, 
especially in authoritarian settings” (Tufeckci and Wilson, 2012, 376). 
Bruns, Highfield, and Burgess (2013) also researched social media use 
in Egypt during the Arab Spring, comparing Twitter usage in Arabic and 
English in both the Egyptian revolution and the civil war in Libya. Al- 
though this “big data” hashtag analysis did not address offline participa- 
tion in the two instances, the volume of tweets and the network interac- 
tion of those tweets indicated that social media played an important role 
in both revolutions. The authors state that one of the motivations for their 
study was to confront the popular narratives about the Arab Spring that 
overemphasized the importance of social media in influencing participa-
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tion in the protest activity (see also Boulianne, 2015, 895). With respect to 
the use of Twitter in Egypt, they conclude that 
 
the substantial level of Arabic tweets in the case of #egypt certainly 
points to the fact that Twitter—and, by extension, other online media— 
did play a role in informing, organizing, and reporting protest activ- ities 
in the country (and most likely continue to do so now, as postelec- tion 
unrest persists), but this does not necessarily translate into support for 
the popular narrative of Egypt as a social media revolution. 
 
Analysis of the Arab Spring from the perspective of Habermas’s public 
sphere reaches a similar conclusion. Salvatore (2013, 219) argues that the 
use of social media in the Arab Spring has been overblown. Rather than 
being the determining factor in several social movements, social media are 
but evolutionary tools in a longer history of using media for revolu- 
tionary purposes. His examples of precursors to media used for dissent 
include the interactive approaches of Al Jazeera, founded in 1996, that 
allowed for people to call in their opinions on programs airing controver- 
sial perspectives, and the popularity of blogs that critiqued authoritarian 
regimes. He argues that we need a more balanced perspective when con- 
sidering the factors contributing to revolutionary activity (see also, Lim, 
2012; Harlow and Guo, 2014). 
 
Such a balance can be found first in acknowledging that in spite of the 
role of the tech-savvy young activists during several years of mobiliza- 
tion in Tunisia and Egypt, the networks that mattered most in the 
revolutionary events were not social networks like Facebook or Twit- 
ter. They were rather universities, mosques, trade unions, and, not 
least, football ultras, which had been active on the street since after the 
first eruptions and fought valiantly and effectively with security forces 
(Salvatore, 2013, 224). 
 
 
GEZI IN EUROPE 
 
What separates the research of the relationship between offline and on- 
line participation in social movements that confront government power, 
as was the case in the Arab Spring uprisings, from our own research is 
the geographical context of both the offline protests in the street or through 
public forums and the online protests in social media. All the research  
cited  above  was  conducted  in  countries  where  the  dissent against 
government decisions or actions took place (Egypt, Libya, Tuni- sia). In 
our research, the protests were located far from the center of the 
oppression, and the protestors may or may not have been actual citizens 
of Turkey. 
Participants in the Gezi Park demonstrations reacted to the violent 
removal of the small group of environmental protestors camped in the 
small park, one of the few remaining green spaces in the center of Istan-
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bul. They were there to protest the replacement of the park with a shop- 
ping center. Locating a shopping center in the park was a flash point for 
the environmentalists as recent years have seen a dramatic rise in the 
number of shopping centers being built in every part of the city. But it was 
the violent way in which the police removed the demonstrators from the 
park early on the morning of May 30 that prompted a full-scale protest by 
thousands of people who came to Taksim Square where Gezi is located. 
What began as a focused environmental protest grew into a movement 
against the Justice and Development party government of then–prime 
minister (and now president) Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. Their grievances 
were many, including the increasingly authoritarian style of leadership, 
violations of rights of personal freedom, media censorship, and concerns 
that the secular government was being converted to one where religion 
and state were being merged. The movement spread from Istanbul to all 
the major cities in the country, and it took several weeks of a harsh 
government crackdown with massive police intervention and excessive 
use of water cannons, tear gas and plastic bullets to disperse the 
demonstrators. 
In contrast, demonstrators in the three countries of our study—Bel- 
gium, Germany and the Netherlands—had little to fear when they orga- 
nized a number of street demonstrations in support of friends and family 
in Turkey. As they followed the news from Turkey and exchanged tele- 
phone and Skype calls, Facebook and email messages, and watched tele- 
vision from satellites or online broadcast from Turkey, they well knew 
the reasons for the protests and the reactions of the government. Living 
in the European countries with the largest population of ethnic Turks, the 
minorities organized events through new and existing organizations, 
planned street demonstrations, raised awareness in their schools and 
places of work, created Facebook pages, and began Twitter campaigns. 
And nobody stopped them, because in democratic Europe, all these activ- 
ities were legal and supported by the European governments. 
 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
In November 2013 through April 2014, we fielded a survey of Turkish 
and Kurdish ethnic minorities whose families emigrated to Europe from 
Turkey. Participants in the survey were either first generation immi- 
grants or (grand)children of workers who left Turkey to make their homes 
in Europe. A large number of the respondents, who resided in Belgium, 
Germany, and the Netherlands, were participants in some form of 
protest—in street demonstrations, in forums, in Facebook-based or- 
ganizations created for protests, and in other social media such as Twit- 
ter. But just as in Turkey, a large number opposed the protests. Respon- 
dents were recruited to complete the questionnaire online through Face-
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book and ethnic organizations we located in social media; and offline in 
predominantly Turkish neighborhoods where potential respondents 
lived, shopped and attended meetings of their organizations. Random 
sample drawing was not possible because of the nature and locations of 
the population, and no publicly available list of names and telephone 
numbers exists. Nearly one-third of the 967 respondents opposed the 
demonstrations in Turkey. For the purposes of this chapter, however, we 
focus on the supporters of the movement, or 639 of the respondents. Of 
those, 36.8 percent lived in Belgium, 27.5 percent in the Netherlands, and 
35.7 percent in Germany. Females constituted 48.7 percent of the respon- 
dents and males 51.3 precent. The mean age of the supporters was 32.6 
years. Fully three-quarters of the supporters were either attending uni- 
versity or had obtained one or more degrees. Although not included in 
this chapter, we also surveyed those who opposed the movement, or 328 
respondents for a total of 967. We asked respondents whether they ac- 
tively supported Gezi (by participating in protests or through social me- 
dia or other ways), supported the movement (but did not actively partici- 
pate), or were against the movement. 
Online participation was measured by respondents’ use of social media 
(Facebook or Twitter) to engage in the movement and by other online 
activities, such as recruiting others through social media, getting their 
information about the movement online, participating in activist online 
forums, and reporting increased use of Facebook and Twitter during Gezi. 
Offline participation was measured by demonstrating in the country where 
they lived, in other European countries or by going to Turkey to 
demonstrate. 
Other offline activities measured were recruiting others face-to-face or on 
the telephone, participation in offline forums, getting their informa- tion 
about Gezi from television or newspapers, by increasing face-to-face 
interactions with other Turkish minorities in Europe during Gezi, by 
hanging the Turkish flag in front of their homes, and by participating in 
previous street protests related to Turkish anti-democratic policies. 
The questionnaire consisted of sixty-four questions (including several 
multi-part ones). Respondents could complete the survey in Qualtrics 
online in multiple languages or offline in the language of their choice. 
Offline questionnaires were distributed, and often retrieved at a later date, 
at meetings of organizations, in headquarters of organizations, and at 
social gatherings in neighborhoods. 
Assuming that offline participation requires more motivation and ef- 
fort than online participation, we pose the following questions and 
hypotheses: 
Q1a: What was the nature of the online and offline participation in the 
Gezi social movement in Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands?
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Q1b: To what extent did participants engage in both online and offline 
activities? 
Q2: What motivated demonstrators to participate in the movement on- 
line and offline? 
The hypotheses are as follows: 
 
H1a:  Those  respondents who  strongly  supported  the  movement in 
their country of residence offline will also report other movement-relat- 
ed offline activities more than online activities. 
H1b: Those respondents who strongly supported the movement 
through social networks online will also report other online movement 
related activities more than offline activities. 
H2: A wider range of issue-based motivations will be related to offline 
participation than online participation. 
H3: A wider range of motivations for feelings will be related to offline 
participation than online participation. 
 
 
FINDINGS 
 
As expected from the recent literature on social movements, most respon- 
dents who participated in street demonstrations also used social media for 
protesting. We asked several questions about the degree of participa- tion 
in a number of areas—offline in the country where they lived, in public 
forums, in other European countries, in Turkey, and by hanging the 
Turkish flag in front of their homes. We also asked about the frequen- cy 
of attending events in public spaces in any geographic location. Sever- al 
questions addressed their online participation in the social media 
(Facebook and Twitter). When we correlated offline participation in the 
country where they lived with social media participation (both measured 
through 5-point Likert scales ranging from never to all of the time), the 
relationship was r= .22 (p=.000). In fact, about one third of the total num- 
ber of respondents who participated both online and offline said they were 
engaged “all the time” in both ways. 
There were differences, however. The correlations between participa- 
tion in the country where they lived and other offline activities were much 
higher than those between social media participation and those activities: 
with the number of times they participated in public forums in the parks 
during Gezi (r=.44; p=.000 vs. r=.25; p=.000); participation in offline forums 
(r=.29, p=.000 vs. r=.25, p=.000); and participation in dem- onstrations in 
other European countries (r=.29, p=.000 vs. r=.19, p=.000). Some who 
demonstrated in their own European country also said they also went to 
Turkey to demonstrate (r=.26, p=.000) while there was a small 
significant relationship between social media participation and go- ing to 
Turkey to demonstrate (r=.11, p=.02) (See table 6.1).
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Those who participated offline and online encouraged others to join the 
movement through social media, but that relationship was much stronger 
for the online participants (r=.53, p=.000) than it was for the offline 
participants (r=.24, p=.000). We also asked about the frequency of 
encouraging others to participate through a telephone or face-to-face con- 
nection, and both groups reported doing that equally (r=.35, p=.00 for both 
online and offline participants in the movement). Only those who 
participated in social media extensively defriended Facebook contacts 
who did not support the protests (r=.18, p=.000), however. 
To test these relationships in a model (Hypotheses 1a and 1b), we 
used linear regression to determine whether heavily investing in other 
offline activities would predict participation in the streets during Gezi. We 
also used linear regression to determine whether those who partici- pated 
in a range of online activities, used the social media (Facebook and Twitter) 
to demonstrate online (See tables 6.2 and 6.3). 
Online protesting during Gezi was significantly predicted by the use of 
Twitter as well as television for following the news on Gezi since the 
protest began, the amount of interest in Turkish life and politics since Gezi 
began, and the use of Facebook to encourage others to join the protest. 
Though several offline activities were positively correlated with online 
participation through use of the social media, none of the offline 
                          activities were significant predictors of social media participation.                                   
 
 
Table 6.1.Protest Participation Online and Offline 
 
Offline Participation in     Online Participation in 
Country of Residence     Social Media (n=486) 
(n=466) 
 
 
Participation in previous street 
r 
.43 
sig 
.000 
r 
.26 
sig 
.000 
protests related to Turkey     
Participation in public forums 
in the parks during Gezi 
.44 .000 .25 .000 
Participation in street protests 
in other EU countries during Gezi 
.29 .000 .19 .000 
Participation in street protests in 
Turkey during Gezi 
.26 .000 .11 .000 
Hung Turkish flag in front of 
home 
.10 .000 .18 .000 
Invited others to participate in 
person or by telephone 
.35 .000 .35 .000 
Participation in offline forums .29 .000 .25 .000 
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Table 6.2.   Predicting Offline Gezi Participation in the Country of Residence 
 
 
Demographics 
Beta                    sig
 
Gender                                                                 .039                    ns 
Age                                                                       -.113                   ns 
Educational attainment                                         .026                    ns 
Length of time lived in the EU                               .042                    ns 
Media Use 
Internet use frequency                                          .008                    ns 
Following Gezi on Facebook                                .013                    ns 
Following Gezi news on Twitter                            .070                    ns 
Following Gezi news on TV                                  -.049                   ns 
Following Gezi news in newspapers                     -.40                     ns 
Activities
 
Inviting others to join movement in person or 
through telephone 
Encouraging others to join movement through 
social media 
 
.143 
 
 
-.013 
 
.03 
 
 
ns
Participation in offline forums                                .082                    ns
 
Became member of online activist discussion 
forums 
Removed friends from social media networks 
who did not support protests 
Frequency of participation in previous protests 
related to Turkey 
 
.065 
 
 
.026 
 
 
.275 
 
ns 
ns 
.000
Increased Twitter use during Gezi                        -.020                   ns 
Increased Facebook use during Gezi                   .051                    ns 
Participated in online activist forums                     .065                    ns
More interactions with Turks living in Europe 
than with others 
Connections with people from Turkey living in 
Europe have increased since Gezi 
Attitudes 
.000                    ns 
 
 
-.097                   ns
 
View of Turkey as at risk during Gezi                    .141                    .04 
Increased interest in life/politics in Turkey            .065                    ns 
Important issue in Gezi was media silence           .002                    ns
 
Important issue in Gezi was conservative 
lifestyle imposition 
 
.048                    ns
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R square = .28    Adj. R square = 
.22 
 
The three significant predictors for offline protesting in the country 
where they lived were previous experience in street protests related to 
anti-democratic decisions or policies in Turkey prior to the 2013 Gezi 
uprising, having a feeling that the country was at risk, and inviting others 
by telephone or in person to participate in demonstrations. 
Although the hypotheses 1a and 1b were supported, a number of the 
online and offline participation variables were unrelated to participation 
through the social media or in the streets (See tables 6.2 and 6.3). Further, 
demographic variables—gender, educational attainment, and age—were 
unrelated to patterns of offline activity, while gender and age were signif- 
icant predictors of online activity. It is not surprising that younger, usual- 
ly male respondents would make greater use of social media, however. 
We expected that as in other studies related to determinations of on- 
line and offline activity that “the more the more” tendency would prevail 
(Ogan, Ozakca, and Groshek, 2008, 175)—in other words, if an individual 
had a tendency to perform one activity online, then that would lead that 
person to do a range of things online. But if that person was averse to 
conducting activity online, he or she would be more likely to perform 
those behaviors offline across a range of activities. And given that in social 
movements it has been shown that offline action is required for success 
(Jacobs, Cook, & Delli Carpini, 2009; Harlow and Harp, 2012) [AU: add to 
ref. list], we expected to see many more connections for a number of other 
activities. 
 
DISPARATE MOTIVATIONS FOR JOINING THE MOVEMENT 
Previously we noted that the impetus for the Gezi Park protests in Istan- 
bul was the government plan to replace the park with a shopping center. 
In recent years Turkey has experienced a shopping center building boom. 
At the time of the Gezi demonstrations, Istanbul had a surplus of shop- 
ping centers, and a debate was ongoing over how many more the city 
could support. The first mall opened in 1988 in Bakirkoy (on the Euro- 
pean side of the Bosphorus), but by 2013, the country had 299 of them. 
Despite a plan for 100 additional shopping centers by 2015, twenty-four 
had already been closed based on a lack of business across the country, 
and eleven of those were located in Istanbul (Kömürcüler, 2013, June 1). 
The government plan for Gezi Park also called for the rebuilding of his- 
torical artillery barracks build by Sultan Mahmud II around the 1830s to 
be dedicated for social gatherings. It was reported that the rebuilt Otto- 
man-style barracks would be the actual location of the shopping mall in 
addition to a mosque, a baroque opera house and a space for other cultu-
  
 
 
Demographics 
Gender 
 
Beta 
 
 
.126 
 
sig 
 
 
.03 
Age -.159 .01 
Educational attainment .087 ns 
Length of time lived in the EU .112 ns 
Media Use   
Internet use frequency .121 .03 
Following Gezi on Facebook .092 ns 
Following Gezi news on Twitter .224 .001 
Following Gezi news on TV .091 ns 
Following Gezi news in newspapers -.006 ns 
Activities   
Inviting others to join movement in person or 
through telephone 
.044 ns 
Encouraging others to join movement through 
social media 
.286 .000 
Participation in offline forums -.051 ns 
Became member of online activist discussion 
forums 
.065 ns 
Removed friends from social media networks 
who did not support protests 
-.006 ns 
Frequency of participation in previous protests 
related to Turkey 
.094 ns 
Increased Twitter use during Gezi -.114 ns 
Increased Facebook use during Gezi .156 .009 
Participated in online activist forums .065 ns 
More interactions with Turks living in Europe 
than with others 
-.018 ns 
Connections with people from Turkey living in 
Europe have increased since Gezi 
-.010 ns 
Attitudes   
View of Turkey as at risk during Gezi -.040 ns 
Interest in life/politics in Turkey before Gezi -.044 ns 
Interest in life/politics in Turkey since Gezi began .110 .04 
Important issue in Gezi was media silence -.055 ns 
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Table 6.3.   Predicting Online Gezi Participation through Social Media 
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Important issue in Gezi was conservative 
lifestyle imposition 
.131                    ns
R square = .38   Adj. R square = 
.32 
 
ral events. The cultural center that currently exists in Taksim would be 
destroyed (as it represents Western-style culture to the majority party). 
While a mall would be a place for the public to gather, protestors claimed 
that the goal was to construct a commercial enterprise, not to preserve a 
green space for anyone to pass through or spend some time socializing or 
enjoying nature. The construction of a replica of the Ottoman-era build- 
ing was also in keeping with the government’s dream of recreating the 
Ottoman Empire through such symbols of past glory. Protestors viewed 
this decision as one that represented the government’s view of the use of 
public space without consulting the people who live and work in central 
Istanbul. 
The transformation of the park to a site for commerce was not the only 
grievance of the demonstrators who joined those in the park. Erdoğan had 
been elected prime minister three times since 2003, largely based on the 
economic success he had achieved in office, but also based on his appeal 
to conservative voters. As the years passed, his opponents had taken issue 
with a range of decisions deemed to be increasingly control- ling, 
unconstitutional, invasive of people’s privacy, or supportive of a 
conservative   and   religious   lifestyle.   Political   opponents   criticized 
Erdoğan for his authoritarian style; accused him of moving ever more 
away from the secular state established by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the 
Republic’s founder, toward an Islamic state; and were angry about his 
stranglehold on the nation’s press through threats, prosecutions, and in- 
timidation (“Turkey’s Troubles,” 2013, June 8; Aknur, 2014). Several oth- 
er decisions made by the ruling party angered a portion of the public, who 
saw Erdoğan’s leadership style as polarizing. This was not a new tactic for 
those in power in Turkey, but an approach that grew worse through the 
prime minister’s tenure (Ete and Taştan, 2014, 24). 
The growing anger across disparate groups with multiple agendas 
and causes came from different experiences, but in the KONDA survey 
taken in Turkey during the protests, the various issues coalesced in a single 
motivation for participating in the movement—to regain individu- al and 
group rights and freedoms in a democratic way through demon- strations 
in the streets (KONDA, 2014, June 5, pp. 34, 39). KONDA’s study was 
conducted from June 6 to 8, 2013, in Gezi Park with 4,411 respondents, 
followed by a field survey in twenty-eight provinces of Tur- key among 
2,629 respondents on July 6 and 7. The point at which the police attacked 
the demonstrators in the park was some kind of a trigger
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for the respondents in the KONDA survey to physically join the move- 
ment. 
In our European survey, we also asked about their reasons for sup- 
porting the movement. In addition to the issues that were prevalent in 
motivating the demonstrators in Turkey, we added issues that might be 
of relevance to the ethnic minorities living in Europe—such as drawing 
the attention of the European Parliament to the Gezi protests, feeling that 
the future of Turkey was at risk, and taking personal responsibility for 
addressing the situation in Turkey. Because our respondents, who made 
their homes in Europe, were not directly affected by the decisions of the 
Turkish parliament or by the attitudes and behavior of the prime minis- 
ter, we expected them to be motivated to demonstrate for somewhat 
different reasons. 
Hypothesis 2 regarding the motivations for strongly participating the 
movement online or offline was supported. The motivations for partici- 
pation were different for those who frequently participated in offline 
activities and those who participated frequently through social media, 
however. We asked several questions (using 5-point Likert scales) related 
to the extent to which the respondents agreed with statements about the 
issues that prompted the Gezi Park protests. We interpreted strong agree- 
ment or agreement with the statements as motivating factors for the re- 
spondents’ own participation. For those respondents who said they most 
frequently participated in the streets, many issues were positively and 
significantly related to the frequency of participation. The strongest rela- 
tionships concerned the feeling that Turkey’s future was at risk and the 
imposition of a conservative lifestyle on the Turkish people (See table 
6.4). Of the thirteen issues we asked about, twelve of those listed in the 
questionnaire were positively and significantly related to the frequency 
of participation in offline activities. 
However, for those who said they participated in demonstrations fre- 
quently through Facebook and Twitter, though all the motivations were 
positively related to online participation, only six rose to the level of 
significance. We interpret that to mean that much more commitment on a 
wide range of issues was required to drive people to participate offline, 
whereas less commitment to various causes for the movement motivated 
online participation. In the regression analyses, none of the motivations 
predicted online participation, but for offline participation, the feeling that 
the country was at risk was significantly related to demonstrating in the 
streets or elsewhere. 
 
 
MOTIVATIONS FOR ONLINE/OFFLINE PARTICIPATION 
 
Many of the stated motivations for participation in a social movement 
like Gezi are also emotionally charged. Some research has been con-
  
 
 
Restriction on freedom 
r 
.16 
sig 
.001 
r 
.07 
sig 
ns 
Authoritarian attitude of prime 
minister 
.14 .002 .07 ns 
Destruction of green spaces .16 .001 .13 .005 
Dysfunction of justice system .12 .009 .08 ns 
Media silence during protests .14 .004 .01 ns 
Feeling that the country was at 
risk 
.20 .000 .12 .01 
Imposition of a conservative 
lifestyle on the Turkish people 
.20 .000 .21 .000 
Protection of the principle of 
secularism 
.12 .015 .121 .009 
Use of violence by the police .13 .005 .08 ns 
Need for 10% election threshold to 
be reduced 
.15 .002 .09 .03 
Taking personal responsibility .16 .001 .13 .006 
To attract the attention of the 
European Parliament to the Gezi 
Protests 
.10 .042 .04 ns 
Support for the orientation of the 
association/political parties in 
which I hold membership 
.04 ns .01 ns 
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Table 6.4.   Motivations for Participating Offline and Online in Gezi Protests in 
Europe 
 
Offline Participation in      Online Participation 
the Country of                   through Social Media 
Residence 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ducted on the role of emotions in social movements, but as Jasper (2011) 
points out in his review article on the subject, in the last two decades 
there has been an explosion in the literature that includes emotion as an 
important part of the research. Jasper observes that protestors were 
viewed as irrational or immature in the 1960s, but by the 1980s, a “dis- 
tinct sociology of emotions had matured” (2011, 14). In Van Stekelenburg 
and Klandermans’s research (2007), the authors write that emotions 
strengthen the movement by accelerating the action taken in a movement 
and amplifying those motives to join the movement. Citing several au- 
thors on the subject (Stekelenburg and Klandermans, 2007; Van Zomeren 
et al., 2004; and Leach et al., 2006), Stekelenburg and Klandermans cite 
anger as a primary motivator of protest movements, which when com-
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bined with efficacy on the part of the participants leads to a normative 
action (2013, 893). 
Efficacy may play a smaller role in online activism, say Earl and Kim- 
pert (2011, 75), contradicting the belief of Postmes and Brunsting (2002). 
“We are not disputing that emotional motivators may matter at times, 
and for some kinds of web activism, but where five-minute activism is 
concerned we are contending that low participation costs are a large 
selling point and that lower amounts of efficacy may be required to agree 
to spend less than five minutes on an issue you care about.” The authors 
speculate that the low cost to participation in a social movement online 
could change the degree of motivation a potential activist might need to 
contribute to the movement in the online environment—even suggesting 
that one does not need to be as angry to post a comment online as to 
show up for a street protest, and that it is possible that collective identity 
online may be minimal or perhaps not even necessary. 
To be sure there was plenty to be angry about in the Gezi protests as 
depicted by the several motivations protestors cited as their reasons for 
taking to the streets or posting information and commentary online. We 
asked Gezi participants about several emotions they may have experi- 
enced, some related to collective identity, such as feeling they were alto- 
gether as a group, and others related to anger at the government for a 
range of policies. If Earl and Kimpert are right about the cost of the online 
activism experience related to the emotional levels required for participa- 
tion, those who participated offline should have expressed higher levels of 
emotion than those who spent most of their time posting in social media. 
That was not the case, however. In the questions related to feeling part 
of a larger entity and feeling a sense of identity, both online and offline 
participants expressed the same level of intensity (See table 6.5). When 
we asked about whether they felt strong together, the online participants’ 
level of feeling together was about twice as strong as that of the offline 
participants. The online participants also claimed to have more fun or 
enjoyment in their experience (r=.245, p=.000 vs r=.058, p=ns). And nei- ther 
group felt they were at risk in their activity, while both felt they were in 
touch with the reality of the situation in Turkey. Both groups also felt a 
sense that they had fulfilled their personal responsibility to Turkey in their 
participation online and offline. 
The results of this part of the survey indicate that online participation 
may well be more emotionally satisfying to the protestors than that of 
participating offline. This would support Earl and Kimpert’s perspective 
on Web 2.0’s effect on online activism, but does not support our third 
hypothesis that a wider range of feelings would be experienced by those 
who participated in public venues.
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Table 6.5.   Relationship between Offline/Online Participation and Feelings 
Related to Gezi Protests 
 
Offline Participation        Online Participation 
 
 r sig r sig 
Part of a larger entity .284 .000 .270 .000 
Feeling of an identity .221 .000 .257 .000 
Togetherness was enjoyable .058 ns .245 .000 
Feeling of being at risk .051 ns .084 ns 
We were strong together .268 .000 .454 .000 
Fulfilled responsibility to Turkey 
though I live in Europe 
.185 .000 .207 .000 
Pride in standing against injustice .180 .000 .363 .000 
Feeling I had little information about 
the reality in Turkey 
-.054 .000 -.087 ns 
 
EMOTIONS FELT ABOUT TURKEY BEING AT RISK 
 
Much has been analyzed and written about social movements over the 
years. Before the Internet, and especially Web 2.0, research was focused on 
street-based demonstrations that required participants to show up in 
person. With the advent of social media, advocates of political and social 
causes can express their attitudes, provide information, and supply mon- 
ey to promote the continuation of the cause even if they never show up in 
person to add their voice to the crowd. This study has examined a social 
movement that took place more than a thousand miles from the site of 
the actual protest in the “squares” across Europe. Social media enabled the 
participants to keep current with events on the ground while ena- bling 
them to read and view video coverage of the ongoing activities. The 
affordances of social media allowed them to stay in constant touch with 
others across the European cities where they lived and across Turkey, 
where the violent uprisings were taking place. Perhaps it was the empa- 
thy they experienced with those who saw their personal freedoms being 
removed from them and being replaced with a set of policies that re- 
quired  a  more  conservative lifestyle.  Perhaps  they  were  watching  as 
friends and family members were being beaten in the street protests. In 
this study, the strongest motivations for participation (online and offline) 
were the feelings that the country of Turkey was at risk and that a conser- 
vative lifestyle was being imposed on an unwilling public. These motiva- 
tions were likely intensified by a range of images and video content avail- 
able across the Internet. For those who demonstrated in public, a some- 
what wider range of motivations led them there, illustrating the Earl and 
Kimport (2011) argument that much online participation comes at much
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lower cost. Interestingly, however, the emotional basis for those motiva- 
tions was stronger for those who participated online than for those who 
took to the streets. Earl and Kimport (2011) also argued that collective 
identity may not be so important in an online environment. This study 
showed, on the contrary, that no matter how they chose to participate, 
the demonstrators felt a strong sense of collective identity. 
The study has also shown that those who demonstrate in the streets are 
also likely to prefer other offline means of expression, while social media 
users tend to stay online for various activities. 
As with all such research with minorities, conducting a survey carries 
with it several limitations. The first was the inability to randomly select 
potential participants in the countries of our study. The second was the 
difficulty in recruiting individuals to complete the survey given the na- 
ture of the topic and the polarization among those who supported or 
opposed the anti-government protests. It is therefore hard to generalize 
from this study to other social movements in a diaspora population. In 
all, under the circumstances, it was a considerable accomplishment to get 
nearly 1,000 respondents to complete the lengthy questionnaire. We are 
hopeful that others can build on this work to learn more about the nature 
of social movement participation in other diasporic groups. 
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